Sortition is a partial answer to restoring the legitimacy of our democracy

Sortition is random selection by lot from the entire population rather than by elections to appoint positions, for instance for parliament. Democracy is generally traced back to ancient Athens, but the democracy the Athenians practised was very different from modern representative democracy, with the default instead being use of sortition, believed to represent rule by the people, in preference to elections which were seen as tending towards oligarchy.

There are many advantages to sortition. Parliamentarians determined by sortition would be representative of the population demographically, so not overwhelmingly rich, white, middle-aged males disproportionately from the legal profession who see parliament as a pit stop on the way to a lucrative career lobbying or sitting on corporate boards. A parliament determined by sortition is the most demographically representative a parliament can get. Everyone has an equal chance so generally the people selected will reflect the population.

The limitations of partisan preselection processes is inherently not an issue in sortition. The outcomes in most elections are not particularly competitive, being reduced to choosing between two, or occasionally three, people preselected by parties, and in a safe seat the effective choice is eliminated altogether. For most voters elections are a largely empty ritual as they are not swing voters in marginal seats so there is little incentive to engage as their vote won’t matter. The determination of who the parliamentarians will be is largely predetermined by the internal party preselection processes. The preselection system produces parliamentarians who are mostly seen as a political class who have worked a corrupt, factional party system to get their position, separate and removed from the average voter.

The corruption of money in politics is much less of an issue when using sortition. Firstly because of bypassing of the partisan preselection process and partisan election, the latter especially coming with significant costs to compete in that are not a factor in sortition. A parliamentarian selected by sortition owes no factional loyalty or favours to donors, and has no need to try to accumulate any for the next election. While of course the possibility of brown paper bags under the table can never be eliminated (though of course a national ICAC would help) the structure of sortition isn’t susceptible to the systemic corruption of money in politics that we currently suffer under.

The use of sortition would reinvigorate parliament. There is research that suggests a proportion of parliament being randomly selected would be beneficial to the functioning of parliament. It would almost certainly mean the institution was not generally dominated by the executive. If a proportion of the lower house this would essentially guarantee a hung parliament with a significant crossbench of sortition parliamentarians meaning the chamber wouldn't be controlled by any one party and functioning as a rubber stamp for the executive.

If people when considering their vote have to keep in mind that perhaps they personally may be called upon to address the issues as a parliamentarian they are more likely to engage with the issues. Even if they assume they won't be called they will know that those selected by sortition will likely be like them rather than from the political class. The distance between the governed and the governing would be bridged. Parliamentarians will become more relatable, in that a significant proportion of them would be ordinary people like other voters, and overall would be more actually representative of the electorate being significantly more diverse, drawing people from all walks of life beyond the narrowed horizons of most professional politicians.

One possible way to seek to address the disturbing levels of disengagement and rage evident in our democracy would be allocating some parliamentary representatives via sortition, the random allocation of positions from among the eligible so all have an equal chance of holding a seat. The disengaged could be represented proportionally in parliament by representatives chosen at random from the population, like jury duty, probably for shorter terms than for other parliamentarians, possibly annually.

Opting for sortition could also be offered to voters on the ballot, at the top of the ticket so also somewhat addressing donkey voting, as an essentially none-of-the-above (below) option. This would provide a mechanism for the enraged to express their frustration that didn’t result in the election of faux anti-Establishment populist parliamentarians, but still definitely had an effect.

Under this model it would also importantly provide an incentive for political parties to try to engage the disengaged, something that they mostly don't have at the moment as demonstrated by the almost total lack of effort to do so. This sortition process would give political parties as incredibly powerful, virtually unregulated institutions in our democracy, some competition. Political parties would have an incentive to engage all potential voters so as to reduce the proportion of parliamentary seats determined by sortition and therefore not under the control of the party whips.

Restoring the legitimacy of our democracy requires that something be done to engage, or at the very least take into account, the huge and growing proportion of citizens completely disengaged from the democratic process and completely unrepresented in parliament. A random selection of representatives are likely to reflect the general will of the electorate at least as well as the representatives from political parties dominated by an elite and beholden to wealthy donors.

Some expression of the protest, active or passive, that this disengagement demonstrates, should be reflected in the election results. Expecting the disengaged themselves to fix the system clearly won't work, so an incentive has to be created for the political class to engage them, or at least take them into account, and a sortition process like this could be such an incentive.

Sortition while not a panacea would be a significant step in the direction of addressing the growing alienation of the electorate from the political process. It is radical approach seeking to limit the power of political parties as institutions largely seen to be out of touch, and to demonstrably seek to include ordinary people in the political process and a willingness to give them power.

A democracy without legitimacy is not really a democracy at all.

The myth of a competitive free market

It is often asserted that capitalism is defined by competition, a competitive free market. But how many markets are actually defined by real competition? For most things the price that the at most several large suppliers or buyers have converged on must just be accepted. Most businesses operate in established markets with established suppliers and customer bases and are not engaged in daily struggle of cut-throat competition with survival of the fittest.

How many markets have many sellers and many buyers? The stockmarket comes closest to this ideal in a sense, as there are many company's shares being sold and many investing in shares (the institutions actually mediating the transactions is another matter). Though even here large institutional investors have increasingly excluded smaller players in a meaningful sense from having much influence.

However other than the stockmarket which is in a sense artificial, other examples of actually competitive markets are few and far between. Perhaps the housing market, especially as it is increasingly and unfortunately less constrained by geography with interstate and international buyers. What else? Restaurants, are an example of an ongoing competitive market at least in cities, with many entrants supplying, and of course lots of people eating, and established players still having to compete to survive.

Entertainment provides some competitive markets, actors and productions especially, and, productions and platforms currently, though this recent phenomenon of many platforms will likely consolidate and most of the significant new players are leveraging their dominance in other markets. Facebook TV is coming. Musicians and platforms arguably, though there are still predominant labels. Authors and publishers/platforms somewhat more recently, though historically large publishers dominate and Amazon arguably supplanting all of them. Standup comedians are actually very competitive and less constrained by a mediating oligopoly like other entertainers. 

Generally competition is suggested by a lot of people entering the market and failing, or getting by on slim margins, and a few doing well but continuing to have to work for it. But other competitive markets beyond those above...? Not too many. Often there are many outlets, but with essentially a local monopoly, and/or also subject to some monopoly or oligopoly one step up the chain. Professionals traditionally had some competition though limited by access to the profession and geography, and increasingly they are subsumed in large firms.

A look back at many of the competitive markets shows they are dominated by individual talent which will inevitably decline and die making room for new competitors. Where markets are based on corporations, virtually everywhere now, corporations that are in a sense immortal, there is less competition. Where markets are based on patents and control of intellectual property, that is government granted monopolies, held by corporations rather than creators there is inevitably less competition.

Competition is not open ended, over time someone (or a small group) will inevitably win, which would be the case if all competitors started on an even footing, and even more so in the economy where they don't. This process is somewhat obscured and ameliorated by new markets forming but that doesn't effect the dominance of the pre-existing market even if reducing its size and importance. Microsoft still dominates in the desktop operating system market despite the emergence of other bigger IT companies in other markets.

In most markets the competition, if there ever was any, has long since devolved into an oligopoly or monopoly, or in other parts of the supply chain a monopsony or oligopsony. Even for above exceptions we see large institutional investors coming to dominate the stockmarket, housing stock getting concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, and McDonalds and other large fast food restaurants.

Economic competition is more like punctuated equilibrium in evolution. Disruptive innovation happens, but then the market settles down again into a new balance without any real competition. Competition is the exception not the norm. What competition there is largely restricted to emerging markets, or those based on individual talent, or those that are essentially gambling, speculation largely divorced from any underlying productive asset.

Our system is also set up to let large companies stifle competition by buying up innovators, or using market power and or corrupt influence with government against them. `Consolidation', `rationalisation' obviously means less competition. This was in the past somewhat recognised by the creation of anti-trust measures, though in practice these have been infrequently utilised, and should be revitalised. However firstly it is important to acknowledge the fact that a competitive free market is basically a myth.

The whole can not be more democratic than the parts

A lot of effort is devoted to the idea of democratic reform of parliament, and rightly so, as it is very far from representative and that undermines the integrity of our democracy. However even if we did manage to achieve Mixed Member Proportional representation, with elements of sortition, the glaring lack of democracy in political parties as institutions that dominate our democracy would still be undermining the functioning of democracy in our country.

Political parties dominate our system of government, despite only being tangentially mentioned in the constitution, and importantly being virtually unregulated by the law or the courts. There is a incentive to register with the relevant electoral commissions and some very limited disclosure of donations, and that is the sum total of regulation of political parties.

Political parties as institutions, functioning largely unhindered by any standards, are also perhaps unsurprisingly overwhelmingly undemocratic. The iron law of oligarchy has long since taken hold of the major parties. Given their dominance of the political system this lack of internal democracy has significant negative flow-on effects for the implementation of democracy in the country.

Hollowing out of the membership of political parties have made them not only less and less representative of the general population, but more and more susceptible to undemocratic practices. The ALP and Liberals are in a very real sense little more than brands rather than political movements. There is no substantive control of either party by the membership, with members reduced to being merely a source of free labour/cheer squad.

Political party membership has correspondingly shrunk, even more so if we discount branch stacking. These are not mass membership parties as they once were, with the total membership of all parties now being a minuscule proportion of the population. Policy is being determined solely by either parliamentarians or leadership staff. The sop to the ALP membership regarding determining the leadership was designed so as the entire membership was able to be vetoed by the caucus.

That caucus, as is those of the conservatives, is made up of former candidates who are regularly determined either centrally and/or by factions and imposed on the membership and then in turn the electorate. In our unrepresentative system, the parliamentary contest is almost always either between the two cartel preselected candidates, or for safe seats basically the preselection of the relevant party determines the parliamentarian. Preselections conducted by corrupt, undemocratic organisations overwhelmingly predetermine who will be in parliament.


Unfortunately in our society the practice of democracy has contracted down to merely this act of voting on choices predetermined by these corrupt organisations every several years, and even that participation is being undermined, for instance with voters supporting longer terms. Voting against democracy, seems to be increasingly common.

Modern democracy emerged from civil society, in the form of clubs, associations, unions, co-operatives, even some churches, and the decline of democracy can be seen in these institutions as well. The practice of democracy on this more intimate level has been undermined by the growth of the organisations involved often reducing members in practice to passive observers, the general tendency towards centralisation, and perhaps the modelling of declining democracy given by the public parliamentary process. People don't really experience much democracy in their day-to-day lives anymore.

Perhaps the most glaring sphere lacking democracy, the one doing most to undermine democracy in other spheres, is the corporate sector, where democracy never took hold in the first place, and which overwhelmingly still operates on something akin to a neo-feudal basis. There are exceptions like co-operatives, but these are in a minority, and in the wider undemocratic context in business have often struggled to maintain their democratic ethos.

The lack of democracy inherent in current business practices, and increasingly in civil society contributes to the undermining democracy at the national level, and vice versa, and likely addressing that decline will require a rejuvenation in these organisations, to then in turn flow to greater expectations in state, national and international contexts.

We probably need to address the issue from all angles, requiring democratic reform of political parties, and seeking to rejuvenate democracy in civil society, and introduce it to the corporate sector. All such reforms would reinforce positive change in the other sectors, much as their decline is reinforcing negative change at present.

The tide is currently against democracy, a principle and practice that has emerged through significant struggle relatively recently in history, that is seemingly underappreciated at present, but it still is maintained by most as an ideal, and it is one worth fighting for. There is hope, in the ability to use new technology, and new innovations in democratic organisations, and combinations of these two developments. Democracy takes work (eternal vigilance), and likely constant innovation to survive and thrive, but it can and must. 

Upper House... meh, MMP Yeah!

Periodically reform of Queensland's democracy becomes a topic of conversation, but all too often it is restricted to a very narrow focus of reintroducing an upper house, as it has again recently with Pauline Hanson's recent vague contribution to the debate.

This preoccupation with an upper house is perhaps understandable because it is familiar as it operates at the federal level and in other jurisdictions, but a closer look at how it operates in those places should give us pause, and let us consider if in fact there isn't something better than simply a better version of what was abolished, and what isn't solving the problems elsewhere.

An upper house would be an improvement on the status quo, but in Queensland that is saying very little at all. Indeed upper houses are often portrayed as being more remote from the electorate than lower houses given the smaller size, large electorates and general role of reacting to the government. The somewhat unfair `unrepresentative swill' label has stuck for a reason.

Historically upper houses operated as a break on democracy, and it is only an accident of history that in Australia they are now more proportional than lower houses, and they are still in that original sense as an institution essentially conservative like the original upper house, the House of Lords. They can play a useful role in terms of scrutiny but they aren't seen as where the power is, which is where the government is formed. That is where the change has to come.

Yes, the Senate and state upper houses (or Tasmanian lower house) are more proportional compared to the corresponding lower house (or upper house), and do give smaller parties a better chance of representation. Though Tasmania and the ACT have demonstrated how this can be manipulated by collusion by the ALP-LNP cartel to exclude minor parties by increasing the quotas. Regardless as the lower houses are extremely disproportionate in their representation of the vote, upper houses being more proportional isn't much of an accomplishment. Lower houses are effectively designed to give a majority to either Labor or the Liberals regardless of the level of support those parties get.

So the Senate for instance is more proportional by comparison to the House of Representatives, but it is still not as proportional as it could be, and not only because it retains the structure of being a `States house', a concept that didn't survive the first encounter with partisanship, but also because of high thresholds to get seats. Meanwhile the House of Representatives is where the government is formed, and in the current system it is almost entirely abandoned to de facto control by the executive except on those rare occasions when the balance of power is held by the crossbench.

The crossbench in the Senate does more commonly hold the balance of power, and in doing so the Senate can, if the Opposition agrees, veto government legislation. It should be noted that there is the further complication of half-Senate elections meaning that almost half the chamber reflects the result of the election before last rather than the most recent election. However the Senate can effectively never pass legislation without government support because the House of Representatives is operating as a rubber stamp for the executive. Mostly the House of Representatives might as well not bother meeting once the numbers have been determined and just proxy to cabinet, which often in turn just defers to the leader.

Similarly Queensland mostly operates with a Legislative Assembly that is just a rubber stamp for the executive, aside from those rare times such as now where by chance the crossbench holds the balance of power. It should be noted that this current circumstance doesn't really reflect a close vote as such, as a similar vote could and have produced very different results. It reflects very concentrated support for the Katter party and an independent and a fair amount of random chance. A proportional democracy in Queensland would look very different. An upper house would improve the situation, but not resolve the basic issues of executive domination and lack of proportionality in the Assembly.

It is generally taken as a given that if an upper house were reintroduced in Queensland it would be in some way proportional (though this is not a requirement). It is also taken as a given that if an upper house were reintroduced the total number of parliamentarians would not be allowed to increase substantially, if at all. That severely limits the ability of any such upper house to be proportional as the number of members would be so small as to create a high threshold for entry. It is also likely it could be so designed as to make it difficult for any third party to get over the threshold, for instance with five electorates of five members each, so a threshold of 16.7% which would mostly keep out parties from beyond the ALP-LNP cartel.

This small chamber with perhaps only a few or even no crossbench would struggle to hold the executive to account as a house of review, even in those instances where the crossbench held the balance of power. However what needs to be understood is that the struggle for accountability is between the parliament and the executive, not the houses of parliament. What is required is to make the lower house that is already in place proportional rather than leaving it in the hands of the executive.

The best way to make parliament proportional is via a system of Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP). MMP is a system of proportional representation that retains local electorates, while allowing a greater degree of proportionality than found in the Senate or similar upper houses. It elects a unicameral parliament where the allocation of seats is split between geographical electorates and a number of ‘list’ positions where the latter are used to ensure the overall makeup of parliament result proportionally reflects the vote of the electorate. Having a house that most accurately reflects the will of the electorate there would be no point then adding on to that another house with a less proportional system of representation.

Most often MMP is done with voters casting two votes, one for the electorate and one for the list. This does allow voters to indicate support for different parties but is mostly only necessary because the electorate counts are first-past-the-post where it is used, so tactical voting is a problem. Use of preferential voting in electorates means that voters can put their preferred party first, thereby meaning that the process of voting in an MMP system can remain as simple as possible with just the one vote.

To voters the process of voting can stay the same as it is; local representation is retained and it allows fair and accurate representation of voters due to the balance provided by the ‘list’ positions. This approach combines the best features of proportional systems and traditional electorate based systems. It would efficiently retain the current unicameral system by introducing proportionality where it is needed, in the Legislative Assembly where government is formed.

If the lists were automatically generated from those candidates from the respective party not elected to seats in order of highest percent of vote received this would increase accountability to the electorate. This would create an incentive for candidates for seats where the party might be unlikely to win to campaign so as to be as high as possible on the list. This automatic list generation would also avoid the issues of lists used for more traditional upper houses where election of candidates is mostly due to intra and inter party backroom deals. 

MMP also has other advantages such as counterbalancing the arbitrary nature of electorate boundaries, where the same vote can produce radically different outcomes depending on arbitrary changes in electoral boundaries. It also addresses the neglect of safe seats, making elections about more than swinging voters in swinging seats. It is the cumulative primary vote in all electorates that determines the proportion of vote for lists. There is therefore an incentive for parties to campaign in all seats, rather than just marginal seats, as any increase in the vote regardless of where it is might result in a more seats.

Another major advantage of MMP is that there would be greater diversity of representation. Aside from the entry into parliament of other parties the lists would mean the one electorate could have representation from more than one party. If independents were treated collectively they too would be more likely to be able to gain entry into parliament. There is no need for a formal threshold, merely the inherent limit due to the number of seats in parliament.

Perhaps most importantly MMP could makes significant progress towards liberating the parliament from the executive, as it is much less likely that parliament will be dominated by one party, accurately reflecting the proportional support for the respective parties. The accuracy of the proportionality would be significantly beyond that provided in an upper house, even when not considering the continuing lack of proportionality in the lower house. MMP could be proportional to within a percentage point due to the lists, not having the high thresholds of an upper house. This would result in parliaments accurately reflecting the diversity of the vote, and therefore require negotiation between the parties for legislation to pass, returning power to the legislature.

The debate about electoral reform is severely diminished when restricted to simply reintroducing an upper house, which while easy to understand due to familiarity was originally a solution to a very different problem. Such a reform would be an improvement on the status quo, but a relatively minor one that would not get at the fundamental issues afflicting our parliament which are centred on the house where government is formed. Again, that is where the change has to come. We need to open up the parameters of the debate and give serious consideration to more radical ideas like this somewhat modified version of MMP.