The new precariousness of safe seats

The traditional pendulum analogy used to describe the safety of seats in terms of margins for the ALP or Coalition doesn't work for a system where more than two parties can win seats, and increasingly that is proving the case in our elections.

The federal electorate of Melbourne, and this election other inner city seats like Melbourne Ports, Higgins and Batman, and the rise of Xenophon in South Australia are showing that the two party duopoly is being challenged and perhaps starting to break down.

While initially this process was limited to the Greens challenging in formerly safe ALP inner city seats in Melbourne and Sydney, recent state elections in NSW and Victoria, and this current federal election, have extended the challenge to Greens versus Liberals or Nationals in safe seats, and Xenophon challenging the Liberals in SA.

This emerging trend for serious challenges of duopoly control of what have previously been considered safe seats means that voters in those seats have to be engaged by the duopoly party that has taken them for granted.

This is an improvement in the quality and engagement of our democracy as it increases the number of voters who `matter' in elections. Given the number of voters who are alienated from the process that can only be a good thing.

The undermining of the concept of a safe seats also means a possible increase in the diversity and proportionality of parliament making it more representative. This is minimal at present, but the number of formerly safe seats being challenged is increasing.

We are moving slowly towards a multiparty system, despite our flawed, duopoly controlled system, and again this is something that would work against voter alienation. This slow move towards a multiparty system is probably the best we can hope for in terms of improvement in our democracy in the short term in the absence of actual democratic reform.

Long term we should work towards the introduction of Mixed Member Proportional which would largely overcome the issue of safe seats limiting the focus of elections to swinging voters in marginal seats, and making parliament proportional.

Mixed Member Proportional Representation

Mixed Member Proportional Representation

Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP) is a system of proportional representation that retains local electorates, and combines the best features of proportional systems and traditional electorate based systems. It elects a unicameral parliament where the allocation of seats is split between geographical electorates and a number of ‘list’ positions where the latter are used to ensure the overall makeup of parliament proportionally reflects the vote of the electorate.

Most often this is done with voters casting two votes, one for the electorate and one for the list. This does allow voters to indicate support for different parties but is mostly only necessary because the electorate counts are first-past-the-post so tactical voting is a problem. A single vote system is certainly possible and is obviously easier, and entails other benefits for providing incentives for parties to engage all voters..

Use of preferential voting in electorates means that voters can put their preferred party first, allowing a single vote approach unlike in jurisdictions like New Zealnd. Therefore to voters the process of voting can stay the same as it is; local representation is retained and it allows fair and accurate representation of voters due to the balance provided by the ‘list’ positions.

The cumulative primary vote in electorates determines the totals for parties to be used to add seats from the lists to achieve proportionality. As this total is based on the total electorate there is an incentive for parties to campaign in all seats, rather than just marginal seats, as any increase in the vote regardless of where it is might result in a more seats. That is it would address the neglect of safe seats, making elections about more than just swinging voters in swinging seats.

It is suggested that the lists could be automatically generated from those candidates from the respective party (independents could be treated collectively) not elected to seats, in order of highest percent of vote received. Again this creates an incentive for candidates for seats where their respective party might be unlikely to win to campaign so as to be as high as possible on the list.

In contrast to introducing an upper house which would duplicate the costs and bureaucracy with more limited gains in the oversight of the executive, especially when control of both houses is secured by a single party, MMP efficiently retains the current unicameral system and would would more effectively liberate the parliament from the executive due to the fact that the parliament, in its entirety, is unlikely to be controlled by one party.

MMP would be very proportional even in contrast to any likely reintroduced upper house that would be small with a still reasonably high threshold for entry. More importantly this proportionality would be achieved in the Legislative Assembly where government is formed MMP.

It also avoids one of the most obvious pitfalls of upper houses as seen in the Senate and other recent elections, the election of random, obscure candidates due to backroom preference deals. While there would be preferences for the electorate seats there are no preference involved in the proportionality embodied in the lists.

A mixed member proportional system ensures that the proportions of parliament are as best as possible in line with the proportion of support for each party. It does not have the cost factors involved with either an expansion or a duplication of parliamentary services that would be associated with reintroducing an upper house. It provides many options for oversight through diversity on committees unlikely to be controlled by a single party.

It would lift the bar for majority rule to 50%, requiring that parliamentarians from different parties work together to achieve their goals. At the same time it lowers the bar for entry to new parties making a greater diversity in parliament much more likely, much better reflecting the actual electorate, and also reducing the likelihood of one party controlling a majority in the parliament.

MMP would efficiently retain the current unicameral system while introducing proportionality in the house of parliament where government is formed. It would counterbalance the arbitrary nature of electorate boundaries. It would make significant progress towards liberating the parliament from the executive. There would likely be a useful byproduct introduce some internal competition in political parties as candidates compete for positions on their respective lists. MMP would in a number of ways significantly increase the robustness of our representative democracy.

Off with our head

Do we need a head of state? In the context of a revival of discussion about Australia becoming a republic there is consequently a revival of the debate about how the replacement head of state should be selected, given disagreement on this derailed the last attempt to become a republic.

However taking a step back I think the question needs to be asked, "Why do we need a head of state?" What do they actually add to the functioning of government? Is the argument of elected versus appointed one worth having when we could just do away with the whole concept altogether, abolishing this vestige of monarchy that serves no real purpose.

In our system the Governor-General, or the monarch on those rare occasions they deign to drop by, as head of state swears in ministers and sign bills into law but really that is just ceremonial, as our the rest of their duties, and none of it is really necessary. They are by convention only meant to act on the advice of council, making the head of state more of an unnecessary appendage.

Once a bill has passed parliament why does it need to be signed by someone else? Being passed by parliament should be sufficient, and in a republic we don't need royal assent. Couldn't parliament just appoint ministers? That would in fact be preferable as it would highlight they are meant to be accountable to parliament rather than the stand-in for some absentee landlord. This would assist parliament to get some power back over the executive.

So why don't we just make parliament sovereign, subject of course to the constitution (preferably with a bill of rights) and as much as possible the people, but in the sense that the parliament fulfills the functions of a head of state like appointing ministers or declaring bills to be ratified as laws. There is no role currently performed by the head of state that would not be more democratic if taken over by the parliament. So off with our head in true republican style.