Mixed Member Proportional Representation

Mixed Member Proportional Representation

Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP) is a system of proportional representation that retains local electorates, and combines the best features of proportional systems and traditional electorate based systems. It elects a unicameral parliament where the allocation of seats is split between geographical electorates and a number of ‘list’ positions where the latter are used to ensure the overall makeup of parliament proportionally reflects the vote of the electorate.

Most often this is done with voters casting two votes, one for the electorate and one for the list. This does allow voters to indicate support for different parties but is mostly only necessary because the electorate counts are first-past-the-post so tactical voting is a problem. A single vote system is certainly possible and is obviously easier, and entails other benefits for providing incentives for parties to engage all voters..

Use of preferential voting in electorates means that voters can put their preferred party first, allowing a single vote approach unlike in jurisdictions like New Zealnd. Therefore to voters the process of voting can stay the same as it is; local representation is retained and it allows fair and accurate representation of voters due to the balance provided by the ‘list’ positions.

The cumulative primary vote in electorates determines the totals for parties to be used to add seats from the lists to achieve proportionality. As this total is based on the total electorate there is an incentive for parties to campaign in all seats, rather than just marginal seats, as any increase in the vote regardless of where it is might result in a more seats. That is it would address the neglect of safe seats, making elections about more than just swinging voters in swinging seats.

It is suggested that the lists could be automatically generated from those candidates from the respective party (independents could be treated collectively) not elected to seats, in order of highest percent of vote received. Again this creates an incentive for candidates for seats where their respective party might be unlikely to win to campaign so as to be as high as possible on the list.

In contrast to introducing an upper house which would duplicate the costs and bureaucracy with more limited gains in the oversight of the executive, especially when control of both houses is secured by a single party, MMP efficiently retains the current unicameral system and would would more effectively liberate the parliament from the executive due to the fact that the parliament, in its entirety, is unlikely to be controlled by one party.

MMP would be very proportional even in contrast to any likely reintroduced upper house that would be small with a still reasonably high threshold for entry. More importantly this proportionality would be achieved in the Legislative Assembly where government is formed MMP.

It also avoids one of the most obvious pitfalls of upper houses as seen in the Senate and other recent elections, the election of random, obscure candidates due to backroom preference deals. While there would be preferences for the electorate seats there are no preference involved in the proportionality embodied in the lists.

A mixed member proportional system ensures that the proportions of parliament are as best as possible in line with the proportion of support for each party. It does not have the cost factors involved with either an expansion or a duplication of parliamentary services that would be associated with reintroducing an upper house. It provides many options for oversight through diversity on committees unlikely to be controlled by a single party.

It would lift the bar for majority rule to 50%, requiring that parliamentarians from different parties work together to achieve their goals. At the same time it lowers the bar for entry to new parties making a greater diversity in parliament much more likely, much better reflecting the actual electorate, and also reducing the likelihood of one party controlling a majority in the parliament.

MMP would efficiently retain the current unicameral system while introducing proportionality in the house of parliament where government is formed. It would counterbalance the arbitrary nature of electorate boundaries. It would make significant progress towards liberating the parliament from the executive. There would likely be a useful byproduct introduce some internal competition in political parties as candidates compete for positions on their respective lists. MMP would in a number of ways significantly increase the robustness of our representative democracy.